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Introduction
There is a long literature on real indeterminacy in monetary models with infinitely-
lived agents. Brock (1975) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) examine a money-in-the-
utility-function (MIUF) model in which the central bank follows a k% money growth rule
and demonstrate the existence of a large class of non-stationary monetary equilibria.
However, there are few examples of similar models in which there are multiple stationary
equilibria.
1   The key feature of these equilibria is that they are subject to stationary
sunspot fluctuations. More recently, following the empirical work of Taylor (1993), there
has been considerable interest in examining whether stationary sunspot fluctuations can
arise with interest rate operating procedures in which the nominal rate responds to
movements in inflation with elasticity τ.  Influential papers include Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (1998), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2000).
A review of these papers leaves one with a bewildering set of conditions necessary
for equilibrium determinacy.  The purpose of this paper is to provide a set of benchmark
results in a fairly general flexible price model.
2    In contrast to the previous work, we
analyze a model with a standard production economy that includes capital accumulation.
The paper demonstrates that the inclusion of investment and capital accumulation
tightens up the determinacy regions so that they are essentially independent of labor
supply and money demand elasticities.  A second extension of this paper is to consider a
much more general transactions structure.  Following Feenstra (1986), we utilize a
general transactions cost function which is isomorphic to a MIUF economy with an
arbitrary cross-partial of utility with respect to consumption and real balances, Ucm.   This2
is particularly interesting as Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1998) examine a
flexible price continuous time MIUF endowment economy and show that the sign of the
cross-partial Ucm is critical to whether or not there is indeterminacy.  They conclude that
“active monetary policies” (τ > 1) are indeterminate (determinate) if Ucm < (>) 0.
3  The
current paper demonstrates that in a production economy with constant returns to scale
the determinacy regions are independent of the sign of Ucm.
4
The key assumption that generates indeterminacy is that some goods require cash
(eg., consumption purchases) while others do not (eg., leisure, investment purchases).
This cash vs. non-cash distinction produces a wedge of inefficiency in the economy, a
wedge that depends on the nominal rate of interest.  If the nominal rate were pegged (τ =
0), then the wedge would be constant and there would be real determinacy in this flexible
price economy.
5  More generally, there would be real determinacy for any exogenous
interest rate path.  However, under a Taylor rule in which the targeted rate moves with
inflation, this distortionary nominal rate becomes endogenous, so that real indeterminacy
may arise. In the case of a Taylor rule responding to forecasted inflation, we need τ < 1 to
ensure determinacy.  In the case of a current-based Taylor rule, only τ = 0 ensures
determinacy.  However, if the central bank looks backward, and only responds to past
inflation, then τ > 1 is needed for real determinacy.  It is important to note that in this case
of a backward rule the current nominal rate is predetermined and does not respond to
current conditions.  Aggressive responses to inflation are in order only if the Taylor rule
is backward looking.
Because the results depend crucially on the nominal interest rate acting like a
consumption tax we consider another monetary environment where both consumption3
and investment purchases are subject to a strict cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint.  In this
case the nominal interest rate is equivalent to an income tax.  We show that the range in
which the economy is uniquely determined is dramatically expanded in this case.  The
question of whether consumption or total output (consumption plus investment) is the
more appropriate scale variable for money demand regressions is clearly a much more
important question than previously thought.
   The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section presents the basic results.
Section two provides some sensitivity analysis.   Section three concludes.
1.  A Flexible Price Monetary Model with Production
The economy consists of numerous identical and infinitely-lived households with






where β is the discount rate, ct is consumption, and 1-Lt is leisure.  Utility is given by:
U(c,1-L) ≡ (c1-σ-1)/(1-σ) - L1+ε/(1+ε),
where 1/ε is the Frisch labor supply elasticity.  Since we are interested in issues of
equilibrium determinacy, we restrict the analysis to a deterministic economy without loss
of generality.  As is well known, if the deterministic model is subject to real
indeterminacy then it is possible to construct sunspot equilibria within the model.
At the beginning of the period, the household has nominal financial wealth denoted
by Wt consisting of fiat money and one-period risk-free bonds.  The household first
travels to the financial market where it receives a lump sum monetary transfer from the
monetary authority (Xt), and can buy/sell bonds (Bt) that earn a gross nominal return of4
Rt.  Any remaining cash (Mt) is used to aid in contemporaneous transactions.  Hence we
have
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The cash balances Mt enter into the following generalized cash-in-advance constraint:
Ptct  ≤  Mtvt.
Below we limit the discussion to equilibria in which this constraint binds (equivalently,
equilibria in which the gross nominal rate exceeds unity).  The household chooses the
fraction of its consumption purchases that it will finance with cash.  With fraction 1/vt ≤
1 being purchased with cash, the remainder (1-1/vt) is purchased with non-cash means
(eg, credit, check, etc.).  These other means entail a real resource cost of cth(vt), where h
is increasing.  Following Marshall (1992) we set h(v) ≡ (a/γ)vγ- (a/γ) where a and γ are
positive constants, and h(1) = 0.
6  The household’s choice of velocity (vt) implies the
following demand for money:
Mt /Pt = ct [a/(Rt - 1)][1/(γ+1)].
This demand function has a unit transactions velocity, and a constant interest elasticity of
[1/(γ+1)].   As γ goes to infinity, the model collapses into a rigid cash-in-advance model
with vt =1.
The household produces output for sale to other households using a CRS Cobb-
Douglas production function f(Kt,Lt) with a capital share of α and a labor share of (1-α).
Kt denotes the household’s accumulated capital stock as of the start of time-t. The
household’s intertemporal constraint is given by5
Wt+1 = Mt + RtBt – Ptct [1+ h(vt)]  + Ptf(Kt,Lt) – PtIt,
where It = Kt+1 - (1-δ)Kt.
Household optimization is defined by the binding cash constraint and the following
Euler equations:
U2(t)/U1(t) = fL(t)/(λtRt)          (1)
U1(t)/(λtRt) = [βU1(t+1)/(λt+1Rt+1)][fK(t+1) + (1-δ)] (2)
U1(t)/(Ptλt) =  RtβU1(t+1)/(Pt+1λt+1)       (3)
vth′(vt)  =  (Rt - 1)/vt                      (4)
λt ≡ {1 + h(vt ) + [(Rt - 1)/vt]}/Rt.      (5)
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
ct [1 + h(vt )] + It = f(Kt,Lt).               (6)
The variable λt ≤ 1 represents the beginning-of-period, private cost of consumption:  the
unit good cost is augmented by the resource cost of the fraction of goods purchased with6
credit and the foregone interest cost of the fraction of goods purchased with cash.  The
sum of these costs is then discounted to express it in beginning-of-period terms.  Note
that the social cost of consumption does not include the foregone interest so that the
resource constraint (6) does not include the nominal rate.
We close the model by assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule
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 or log-linearizing (with tildes denoting log deviations from steady-state)
j t t R + = π τ~ ~
where πt+j ≡ Pt+j/Pt+j-1 is the price movement between t+j and t+j-1, and ss denotes steady-
state.  Taylor (1993) originally posited a current rule (j = 0), but there is substantial
empirical and anecdotal evidence that central banks are forward-looking and base current
policy on forecasts of inflation (j = 1).  For completeness we also consider a backward-
looking rule (j = -1).
Note that under any interest rate policy the central bank allows the money supply
to move endogenously to hit the target.  As demonstrated by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2000b), it is very unlikely for real indeterminacy to arise in this model when the central
bank follows an exogenous money growth process.  Hence, the real indeterminacy that
arises under Taylor rules arises because of the endogenous movement in money supply
growth rates.  That is, when there is real indeterminacy under an interest rate policy it is
because there is more than one money growth rate consistent with the given interest rate
policy.7
There are actually two types of indeterminacy that may arise.  First, there is
nominal indeterminacy—are the initial values of the price level and all other nominal
variables pinned down?  In our notation this corresponds to the question of whether πt ≡
Pt/Pt-1 is determined (where t is the initial time period).  This nominal or price level
determinacy is a typical occurrence under many interest rate operating procedures, the
most celebrated example being an interest rate peg.  This nominal indeterminacy is of no
consequence in and of itself, but is important only if it leads to real indeterminacy.
By real indeterminacy, we mean a situation in which the behavior of one or more
real variables is not pinned down by the model.  This possibility is of great importance as
it immediately implies the existence of sunspot equilibria which, in the present
environment, are necessarily welfare reducing.  In the flexible price model of this paper
real indeterminacy manifests itself as an indeterminacy in the nominal interest rate path.
Since this rate distorts real behavior, this is a form of real indeterminacy.
We now state our principle results:
Proposition 1: Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).   If the central bank follows a forward-
looking Taylor rule, then a necessary and sufficient condition for real determinacy is τ <
1.   The economy, however, is always subject to nominal indeterminacy.
Proof:  See the appendix.
Proposition 2: Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).  If the central bank follows a current-
looking Taylor rule then there is real and nominal indeterminacy for all values of τ  ≠ 0.
Proof:  See the appendix.
Proposition 3:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).  If the central bank follows a backward-
looking Taylor rule, then a necessary and sufficient condition for real determinacy is τ = 08
or τ > 1.  In the case of τ = 0 there is nominal indeterminacy, but there is nominal
determinacy if τ > 1.
Proof:  See the appendix.
Although the exact analytical results of Propositions 1-3 disappear as ε increases
and labor supply becomes less elastic, the quantitative impact is extremely small.  Later
we provide some sensitivity analysis.
Notice that the determinacy results are entirely independent of money demand.
The propositions imposed no restrictions on the size of the interest elasticity, 1/(γ+1).
Following Feenstra (1986) we can gain some insight into this robustness by considering
the corresponding MIUF economy. We can rewrite the above problem in terms of the
indirect utility function W(et,mt) – V(Lt), where et = ct [1 + h(vt )] (e = consumption
expenditures inclusive of transactions costs). This implies We = U’(ct)∂g/∂e = U’(ct)/ λtRt
(where c = g(e,m)).  In a production economy, the labor market and capital accumulation
margins restrict the behavior of We.  For example, with linear production and linear
leisure, We is constant and independent of real money balances.  This will be true, and
thus the exact nature of the results will occur, whenever the assumption of linear leisure is
coupled with a CRS production function.  Differing money demand elasticities simply
correspond to differing supporting money supply processes.
 7
To develop intuition about why indeterminacy may arise it is helpful to consider
the extreme version of the model in which γ goes to infinity and the model collapses to
the familiar rigid cash-in-advance model as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995).  In this case,
λt = 1, and (1) and (3) become9
U2(t)/U1(t) = fL(t)/Rt          (7)
U1(t)/Rt = [βU1(t+1)/Rt+1][fK(t+1) + (1-δ)].        (8)
Equation (7) embodies the cash vs. non-cash distortion—the income from selling leisure
is not available for consumption until next period.  The nominal rate acts as a distortion,
driving a wedge between current labor effort and current consumption.  Similarly,
equation (8) is the standard optimal growth condition distorted by the nominal rate of
interest.  The nominal rate can thus be interpreted as a consumption tax of (1+tax)= Rt.  A
high nominal rate is equivalent to a high consumption tax, and a low nominal rate is
equivalent to a low consumption tax.
As noted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), if the nominal interest rate is constant,
then equation (8) collapses into the optimal growth Euler equation.  Hence, in a model
with inelastic labor, an interest rate peg is the optimal monetary policy and real behavior
will be determinate although there is nominal indeterminacy.
8   But if the nominal rate
(consumption tax) is endogenous, as occurs under a Taylor rule, then real indeterminacy
may arise.
Under a forward-looking Taylor rule, increases in expected inflation increase the
nominal rate but depending on the elasticity τ these increases may or may not increase the
real rate.  The Taylor rule implies
t t t t R R
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For aggressive policies (τ > 1), nominal rate increases are associated with increases in the
real rate of interest.  Thus, we have an implicit consumption tax (the nominal rate)
correlated tightly with expected consumption growth (the real rate).  The self-fulfilling10
circle goes something like this.  A sunspot-driven increase in expected inflation increases
today’s nominal interest rate and thus increases the opportunity cost of holding money.
This lowers current consumption, which in turn increases the real rate of interest.  With τ
> 1, the nominal rate (consumption tax) rises with this real rate movement which
completes the circle.  The initial increase in expected inflation is therefore rational.
9  This
circle is broken in the case of τ < 1.
Note that in the case of a forward rule πt is free for all values of τ.  Τhis nominal
indeterminacy also arises in the case of a current based rule, but now it is more
problematic.  Since πt is free, a current-based policy implies that Rt is also free. Since Rt
acts like a tax on consumption, real behavior is not pinned down.  The nominal
indeterminacy from before is now real. The reason for this indeterminacy is because the
policy rule is responding to current inflation, which is not pinned down for standard
nominal indeterminacy reasons.  Because of the policy rule this nominal indeterminacy
becomes real.  More generally the potential for indeterminacy in both the current- and
forward-looking rules arises whenever policy responds to endogenous variables that are
not predetermined.  This is why an interest rate peg (τ = 0) has real determinacy.
This discussion suggests that the central bank should look backwards so that it
responds only to predetermined variables.  Remarkably, by looking backwards the
conditions for determinacy are (almost) entirely flipped on their head from when the
Taylor Rule is forward-looking.  If the monetary authority responds aggressively to past
inflation (τ > 1) initial inflation and hence Rt+1 is pinned down (the policy rule implies
that Rt is predetermined by last period’s inflation rate).  Hence, there is real and also11
nominal determinacy if and only if τ > 1.  (An interest rate peg of τ = 0 yields real but not
nominal determinacy.)
The intuition why an aggressive backward-looking policy can eliminate nominal
and real indeterminacy is as follows.  Suppose there is an increase in the current price
level πt of 1%.  This implies that next period’s nominal rate must rise by τ%.  This
increase in the future nominal rate (consumption tax) leads to an increase in current
consumption.  This implies that the real rate falls.  The policy rule implies that the current
nominal rate does not respond to πt.  Hence, the decline in the real rate must lead to an
increase in πt+1 that is greater than the initial increase in πt.  This behavior is explosive,
and thus eliminates this as a possible equilibrium path.
The idea that responding to a nominal variable can pin down prices is not new.
This result is a general equilibrium generalization of McCallum’s (1981) earlier result.
He argued that because an interest rate peg suffered from nominal indeterminacy the
monetary authority needed a nominal anchor, which could be accomplished by
responding to a nominal variable.  This analysis confirms this but shows that merely
responding to a nominal variable, like past inflation, is not enough.  The monetary
authority has to aggressively respond to past inflation to ensure both real and nominal
determinacy.
2. Sensitivity Analysis.
Because of the irrelevance of the money demand elasticity we impose the
convenient rigid CIA constraint (γ equal to infinity) for the remainder of the paper.
However, we reiterate that none of the results are affected in a quantitative sense by this
assumption.12
a. General Labor Supply Elasticity.
The key simplifying assumption in Propositions 1-3 is that ε = 0, so that labor
supply is infinitely elastic (recall that labor supply is 1/ε).  Hence, the first issue we
consider is the sensitivity of these results to a less elastic labor supply (ε > 0).  This is
particularly interesting as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s (2000) results were sensitive to the
assumed labor supply elasticity.
 10
Before proceeding, we can replicate Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s (2000) results and
demonstrate the importance of labor supply elasticity by dropping capital from the model,
assuming that the production function is linear in labor, and imposing σ = 1 so that
consumption preferences are logarithmic.  Under these assumptions, the labor market
equation (1), the Fisher equation (3), and the resource constraint c = L, can be combined



















where λt = 1 because of the rigid CIA constraint.















We have real and hence nominal determinacy if and only if this mapping is explosive.
We have two cases.  If ε < 1, then there is determinacy if and only if 1 < τ < (1+ε)/(1-ε)
(this is Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s Proposition 3 with 1/ε equal to their θR).   If ε > 1,
then there is determinacy as long as τ > 1 (this is their Proposition 4).  As in the model
with capital if we assume linear labor (ε = 0) there is always indeterminacy as πt ≡ Pt/Pt-113
and hence Rt is free.  But surely an infinite labor supply elasticity is not compelling and as
we increase ε to, say, 2 (a labor supply elasticity of 1/ε = 0.5), then the determinacy
region apparently becomes quite large with any τ > 1 ensuring determinacy.
However, the inclusion of capital and the added investment region almost
completely eliminates this determinacy region.  Determinacy is more likely as labor
supply becomes less elastic.  Suppose we drive ε to infinity so that we stack the deck in
favor of indeterminacy.  Even in this case, the determinacy region is incredibly small.  For
example, if α = 0.34, β = 0.99, δ = 0.02, σ = 1 the range of determinacy is 1 < τ < 1.0014.
As ε falls below infinity, this region shrinks even more.
What about a forward-looking rule?  Proceeding as before with a labor-only
economy the relevant difference equation is
1 2
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This mapping is explosive and we have determinacy if τ < 1, or if ε > 1 and τ > (1+ε)/(ε-
1).  This latter region is operative for plausible labor supply elasticities.  However, once
again the addition of capital restores the earlier result that there is determinacy if and only
if τ < 1.  For example, if α = 0.34, β = 0.99, δ = 0.02, σ = 1 then the range of determinacy
remains at τ < 1.




























We have two cases.  If ε > 1, then there is determinacy if and only if 1 < τ < (1+ε)/(ε-1).
If ε < 1, then there is determinacy as long as τ > 1.  As before, the addition of capital14
eliminates the former region, and we are left with τ > 1 being necessary and sufficient for
determinacy.
The thrust of these results is that in a model with capital, real indeterminacy under
a Taylor rule becomes much more likely (compared to a labor-only economy).  Recall that
in this monetary model the nominal interest rate manifests itself as an endogenous
consumption tax.  Real indeterminacy under such a tax is much more likely when we add
an investment margin to the analysis as the household can more readily shift consumption
across time.
b. Investment Subject to CIA.
A key feature of the previous analysis is that only consumption spending is subject
to a transactions constraint.  Given the relative sizes of consumption and investment
purchases this assumption is entirely reasonable as one would expect that the advantage
of alternative transactions arrangements would be increasing in the size of the transaction.
However as a test of robustness we consider the opposite extreme and assume that both
consumption and investment are subject to a rigid CIA constraint.  In this case the
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In this case, the nominal interest rate distorts all factor payments as it enters
symmetrically on the productivity of labor and the return to capital.  Hence, the nominal
interest rate now acts as an income tax.
The principle result of this section is that when both consumption and investment
are treated symmetrically, the likelihood of real indeterminacy shrinks dramatically.  In15
the earlier sections consumption and investment were treated asymmetrically so that an
increase in the nominal rate had a powerful depressing effect on consumption via a direct
effect on the current cost of conducting transactions, and an indirect effect of increasing
investment spending as the household postponed consumption until transactions costs
fell.  But in a model in which both consumption and investment are both subject to a
common transactions constraint, the latter effect is reversed so that a higher nominal
interest rate path also discourages investment spending.  This effect acts as an automatic
stabilizer and makes real indeterminacy much less likely.   In particular we have the
following:
Proposition 4:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor). Suppose that consumption and
investment are subject to a strict CIA constraint and that monetary policy is given by a
forward-looking rule.  A sufficient condition for real determinacy is τ < 1.  If
() () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 > + − − − α δ β α , τ < 1 is necessary and sufficient for determinacy.  If
() () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α , the determinate regions are τ < 1 and
τ >  = * τ ()
() () 1 1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 2
1
− + − +
− −
+
α δ β α
δ β
.
The economy, however, is always subject to nominal indeterminacy.
Proof:  See the appendix.
Remark:  For all plausible parameter values, the condition  () () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α
will be satisfied so that the model is determinate for all τ outside of [1,  * τ ].  This range
is quite small.  With α = 1/3, β = .99, and  δ = .02, the model is determinate unless τ is
between 1 and 1.0475.   Recall that in the model in which only consumption is subject to16
CIA there is determinacy if and only if τ < 1.  Hence, the determinacy region is much
larger in the model in which investment is also subject to CIA.
Proposition 5:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor). Suppose that consumption and
investment are subject to a strict CIA constraint and that monetary policy is given by a
current-looking rule.  An interest rate peg of τ = 0 exhibits real determinacy but nominal
indeterminacy.  For nonzero τ, a necessary condition for real and nominal determinacy is
τ > 1.  This is both necessary and sufficient if
() () ( ) 0 2 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 < − − − − − + − − − α δ β α τ α δ β α .
Proof:  See the appendix.
Remark:  As before, the condition in the proposition is satisfied for all plausible
parameter values.  Hence, there is determinacy for all τ > 1.  Recall that in the model in
which only consumption is subject to CIA, there is indeterminacy for all values of τ.
Once again, imposing the CIA constraint on investment significantly expands the region
of determinacy.
Proposition 6:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).   Suppose that consumption and
investment are subject to a strict CIA constraint and that monetary policy is given by a
backward-looking rule.  An interest rate peg of τ = 0 exhibits real determinacy but
nominal indeterminacy.  For nonzero τ, a necessary condition for real and nominal
determinacy is τ > 1.  If  () () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α , then τ >  * τ  >1 is necessary and
sufficient for real and nominal determinacy where  * τ  is given by
= * τ ()
() () 1 1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 2
1
− + − +
− −
+
α δ β α
δ β
.17
Proof:   See the appendix.
Remark: For plausible parameter values the condition  () () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α  is
surely satisfied and there is determinacy as long as τ > 1.0475.   Thus the general result
that responding aggressively to past inflation guarantees determinacy continues to hold
with both consumption and investment subject to a CIA constraint.
Table I summarizes the bounds for real determinacy for all three monetary policy
rules when only consumption is in the CIA constraint and when both consumption and
investment are in the constraint.  While the bounds for uniqueness were clearly expanded
for both a forward and a current-looking rule, the bounds for determinacy are actually
slightly narrower for a backward-looking rule.  This does not contradict our earlier result
that the region in which the economy is indeterminate shrinks with investment in the CIA
constraint.  The reason is because unlike propositions 1-3 where the economy was
necessarily indeterminate when  there was not real determinacy, in propositions 4-6 the
economy is frequently overdetermined when it is not uniquely determined.  See the proofs
in the appendix for details.
3. Conclusion
This paper has utilized a standard business cycle model to explore the issue of
equilibrium determinacy when the central bank conducts policy according to a Taylor
rule.  In a model in which consumption but not investment purchases are subject to a
transactions constraint, there is real indeterminacy whenever the central bank responds
too aggressively to current or future inflation.  Under a forward-looking Taylor rule we
need τ < 1 for determinacy, while there is indeterminacy under a current Taylor rule for
all τ > 0.  To ensure real and nominal determinacy, the central bank should respond18
aggressively (τ > 1) to lagged inflation rates.  By responding aggressively, the central
bank can pin down prices and achieve nominal determinacy but avoids real determinacy
by making the current nominal rate predetermined.  The empirical robustness of this
result warrants restatement.  The endogenous velocity model of Section 1 is remarkably
general, and the results are quantitatively unaffected by the interest elasticity of money
demand, the share of consumption goods purchased with cash (steady-state velocity), the
sign of Ucm in the isomorphic MIUF economy, or the labor supply elasticity.  This is not a
knife-edge result.
However, these results are affected by the assumption on which transactions are
subject to a finance constraint.  In an environment with a strict CIA constraint on both
consumption and investment purchases, there is determinacy under a forward-looking
rule for essentially all values of τ, while essentially any τ > 1 ensures determinacy under
both a current-looking and backward-looking rule.  We thus conclude that the investment
margin has an enormous influence on the determinacy regions.  Future work should not
only include explicit investment spending and capital accumulation, but also carefully
examine the assumption on which purchases are subject to finance constraints.  The
question of whether consumption or total output (consumption plus investment) is the
more appropriate scale variable for money demand regressions is clearly a much more
important question than previously thought.
Another important question is how all these results are affected by the presence of
nominal rigidities.  Not surprisingly the form this rigidity takes is critical.  For example,
its easy to see that in a strict limited participation environment such as Fuerst (1992) (see19
eg., Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999)) that determinacy becomes extraordinarily difficult
whenever the central bank operates off of interest rate rules.
Recently there have been papers that have attempted to answer this question in
sticky price models.  For example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Kerr and King
(1996) analyze reduced-form sticky price models and conclude that τ > 1 is needed for
determinacy.  There are two fundamental differences between these papers and the
current work.
First, these sticky price models use a MIUF model with “cash-when-I’m-done”
timing.  As demonstrated by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000a), if one adjusts the money
demand formulation to the more appropriate timing convention, then forward-looking
rules are always subject to real indeterminacy.
The second principle difference between the analyses is that these sticky price
models ignore the role of investment spending as they are labor-only production
economies.  The current paper makes clear that ignoring this margin is problematic.
Hence, an important research question is the bounds for determinacy in a sticky price
model that explicitly includes investment spending.20
Table I
Bounds for Real Determinacy in Various Monetary Models
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        τ > 1.0475*
 τ >1* & τ = 0  τ > 1.0475* &
 τ = 0
*Denotes that the conditions depend on assumed numerical values.  See the text for details21
Appendix
Proposition 1: Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).   If the central bank follows a forward-
looking Taylor rule, then a necessary and sufficient condition for real determinacy is τ <
1.   The economy, however, is always subject to nominal indeterminacy.
Proof:   Given the assumption that utility is linear in leisure (ε = 0) the first order
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Plugging (A1) and equation (A1) scrolled forward one period into (A2) yields:
() xE x x tt t t
αα αβ β δ =+ − ++ 11 1 ( ) ) (A3)















The remaining condition is the resource constraint Kt+1 = H(xt,ct,Kt).  Since capital does
not enter into either (A3) or (A4) the resource constraint separates out.  The resource
constraint provides one eigenvalue  1






e .  There is only one
predetermined variable.  Therefore for the economy to be determinate one of the two












































The remaining two eigenvalues are the roots of the following quadratic equation:
0

















The three eigenvalues of the system are thus
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3 = e .
Since there is only one predetermined variable, for the economy to be determinate two
eigenvalues need to lie outside the unit circle.  e3 is outside the unit circle if τ < 1.  In any
event, the initial πt is free so that there always is nominal indeterminacy. QED
Proposition 2: Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).  If the central bank follows a current-
looking Taylor rule then there is real and nominal indeterminacy for all values of τ ≠ 0.
Proof:  In the case of τ = 0, (A4) backs out the path of πt+1 implied by the dynamics of
(A3) and the resource constraint.  This latter system has eigenvalues
1
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so that we have real determinacy because we have one predetermined variable (the capital
stock).  There is nominal indeterminacy because πt is free.  For τ > 0, we follow the proof
in Proposition 1 and are once again left with the first order conditions (A3) and (A4) and
the eigenvalue e1 > 1 given by the resource constraint.  Once again there is only one
predetermined variable.  Therefore for the economy to be determinate one of the two
eigenvalues of the following log-linearized two dimensional system (A3 and A4) need to
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The remaining two eigenvalues are the roots of the following quadratic equation:
0
) 1 )( 1 ( 1










The three eigenvalues of the system are thus
1






e ,  1






e , 0 3 = e .
The economy is therefore always indeterminate.  This also implies nominal indeterminacy
as πt is free.  QED
Proposition 3:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).  If the central bank follows a backward-
looking Taylor rule, then a necessary and sufficient condition for real determinacy is τ = 0
or τ > 1.  In the case of τ = 0 there is nominal indeterminacy, but there is nominal
determinacy if τ > 1.
Proof:  For the case of τ = 0, the proof is symmetric to Proposition 2. For τ > 0, we
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Including the resource constraint we have the following eigenvalues
1






e ,  1






e ,  τ = 3 e .
Hence, there is real determinacy if and only if τ > 1.  Note that since the system begins
with πt, we also have nominal determinacy in the case of τ > 1.  QED
Proposition 4:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).   Suppose that consumption and
investment are subject to a strict CIA constraint and that monetary policy is given by a
forward-looking rule.  A sufficient condition for real determinacy is τ < 1.  If24
() () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 > + − − − α δ β α , τ < 1 is necessary and sufficient for determinacy.  If
() () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α , the determinate regions are τ < 1 and
τ >  = * τ ()
() () 1 1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 2
1
− + − +
− −
+
α δ β α
δ β
.
The economy, however, is always subject to nominal indeterminacy.
Proof:   Given the assumption that utility is linear in leisure (ε = 0) the first order

























Substituting (A5) and equation (A5) scrolled forward one period into (9) yields the
rewritten capital accumulation equation:
() 1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + − + = t t t t t R x x R x
α α δ β αβ (A6)
























































δ τβ α δ β
Since capital does not enter into either (A5) or (A6) the resource constraint separates out
providing the following eigenvalue
1







Solving the above system of equations the other two eigenvalues are given by the solution
to the following equation:
() ( ) [] 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) (
2 = − + − − − − − + − − = τ α δ α β δ αβτ δ β τ e e e J
For the economy to be determinate one of these two eigenvalues need to lie outside the
unit circle.  After some algebra we have
() ( ) [] ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( α δ β α τ α α δ β + − − − + + − − − = − J
) 1 ( ) 0 ( τ α − = J
() ( ) ( ) 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( − − − − = τ α δ β J
When τ < 1  J(-1) > 0, J(0) > 0, and J(1) < 0 and therefore only one root lies within the
unit circle and the economy is determinate.  Hence, τ < 1 is sufficient for determinacy.  If
τ > 1, then J(0) < 0 and J(1) > 0 so that there is one root in (0,1).  For the other root to be
outside the unit circle, the necessary and sufficient condition is J(-1) < 0.  If
() () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 > + − − − α δ β α , this is never satisfied and the system is underdetermined.  If
() () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α , and τ > τ* then J(-1) < 0, and again the economy is
determinate, while if 1 < τ < τ*  J(-1) > 0 and the system is underdetermined.  In any
event, the initial πt is free so that there always is nominal indeterminacy. QED
Proposition 5:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor). Suppose that consumption and
investment are subject to a strict CIA constraint and that monetary policy is given by a
current-looking rule.  An interest rate peg of τ = 0 exhibits real determinacy but nominal
indeterminacy.  For nonzero τ, a necessary condition for real and nominal determinacy is
τ > 1.  This is both necessary and sufficient if
() () ( ) 0 2 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 < − − − − − + − − − α δ β α τ α δ β α .
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Since capital does not enter into either (A5) or (A6) the resource constraint separates out
providing the following eigenvalue
1







Solving the above system of equations the other two eigenvalues are given by the solution
to the following equation:
() ( ) [] () [] 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1
2 = − − + + − − − − − ατ δ βτ α δ αβ δ β τ e e
For the economy to be determinate one of these two eigenvalues need to lie outside the
unit circle.  After some algebra we have
() () ( ) α δ β α τ α δ β α 2 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( − − − − − + − − − = − J
ατ − = ) 0 ( J
() ( ) ( ) 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( − − − − = τ α δ β J
Note that J(0) < 0 and J’(0) > 0 for all τ.  If τ < 1, J is concave and J(1) and J(-1) are both
negative implying that both roots are either outside or inside the unit circle.  In the first
case the system is overdetermined, while in the latter it is underdetermined.   Hence, τ > 1
is necessary for determinacy in which case J(1) > 0.  If J(-1) < 0, τ > 1 is necessary and
sufficient for determinacy.  QED
Proposition 6:  Assume that ε = 0 (linear labor).   Suppose that consumption and
investment are subject to a strict CIA constraint and that monetary policy is given by a
backward-looking rule.  An interest rate peg of τ = 0 exhibits real determinacy but
nominal indeterminacy.  For nonzero τ, a necessary condition for real and nominal
determinacy is τ > 1.  If  () () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α , then τ >  * τ  >1 is necessary and27
sufficient for real and nominal determinacy where  * τ  is given by
= * τ ()
() () 1 1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 2
1
− + − +
− −
+
α δ β α
δ β
.
Proof:   Proceeding as in the previous two propositions we have
As before, the resource constraint separates out and provides one explosive eigenvalue,
1







and one predetermined variable, Kt.   Solving the above system of equations yields the
following cubic characteristic equation:
Note that J(0) > 0 and J’(0) < 0.  Since the cubic coefficient is positive, we know that
there is one negative root, and two positive roots.  For determinacy, we need one root
outside of the unit circle (we have two predetermined variables, Kt and  πt-1).   Algebra
implies
() ( ) ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( τ α δ β − − − − = J
)] 1 ( 1 [ 2 )] 1 )( 1 ( 1 )[ 1 ( ) 1 ( δ β α δ β α τ − − − + − − − − = − J
If τ < 1 J(-1) < 0 so that there is one root in (-1,0).  We also have J(1) > 0, so we either
have two roots in (0,1) or two roots outside (0,1).  In the former case we have
indeterminacy, while in the latter the system is overdetermined.   Hence, for determinacy
we need τ > 1.  If τ > 1 we have J(1) < 0 and one root in (0,1).  We now must consider
J(-1).  If  () () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 > + − − − α δ β α , then J(-1) < 0 for all τ > 1, and the system is
overdetermined.  If  () () 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 < + − − − α δ β α , then for τ >  * τ , J(-1) > 0 and we have
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Footnotes:
                                                          
1A few significant counterexamples include Matsuyama (1990,1991) and Woodford (1994) who
demonstrate the possibility of endogenous fluctuations in monetary economies operating under k% money
growth rules.  Woodford also considers an interest rate peg and demonstrates that such a policy typically
ensures equilibrium determinacy.
2 The paper closest in spirit to the current analysis is Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000).  They consider a
flexible-price environment in which the fiscal authority follows a balanced-budget requirement and the
central bank follows a Taylor-type interest rate operating procedure.  One result of Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2000) is that a balanced budget policy is Ricardian.  Hence although we do not impose a balanced-
budget constraint below, our results on determinacy under interest rate rules are directly comparable to
theirs.  Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe consider both a current Taylor rule in which the central bank responds to
movements in the current inflation rate, and a forward-looking Taylor rule in which the central bank
responds to expected inflation.  In the case of the current rule, they report that there is real determinacy for a
range of τ between one and some upper bound, while the forward-looking rule is determinate only if τ < 1.
Their results, however, were for a labor-only cash-in-advance economy and were sensitive to the assumed
labor supply elasticity.
3 Calvo (1979) demonstrates the possibility of multiple stationary equilibria in a continuous-time, money-in-
the-production-function (MIPF) model under several different monetary policies (including an inflation
peg).   He concludes that an inflation peg is indeterminate.  Since a MIPF environment is a  MIUF
endowment economy with Ucm < 0, Calvo’s results are simply a special case of Benhabib et al. (1998).
4 Along with the explicit production technology, a second important difference between this paper and
Benhabib et al. (1998) is that the discrete time counterpart to their continuous time model is a “cash when
I’m done model”. That is, money “at the end of the period” is used to facilitate trade, while this paper uses
money “at the beginning of the period.”  Surprisingly this last difference is quite important. Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2000a) discuss the effect that these timing differences have on indeterminacy.
5 The standard nominal indeterminacy would arise but this is of no consequence for real behavior.
6 Using  M1, Marshall (1992) estimates a = .00923, γ = 1.79.32
                                                                                                                                                                            
7 Straightforward calculations imply that the sign of Wem is given by the sign of (1+γ)-σ.  As γ becomes
large and we move towards a CIA economy and Wem necessarily becomes positive.  Since we are not
restricting γ, we are also not restricting Wem.
8 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) note that while real behavior is unique under an interest rate peg there is
nominal indeterminacy since the money growth process is only unique up to the addition of a mean-zero iid
term.  In a limited participation model this nominal indeterminacy spills over into real indeterminacy.  This
occurs because in a limited participation model equation (2) holds only in an expected value sense.   Real
behavior will still be uniquely determined, however, for a given money growth process.
9 Woodford (1994) shows that a k% money growth rule can produce stationary sunspot equilibria in a
Lucas-Stokey (1987) cash-in-advance model only if the constant of relative risk aversion (σ) is large
enough (see his Proposition 6). With a k% money growth rule and a rigid cash-in-advance constraint the
nominal rate tracks the real rate with an elasticity of  (σ-1)/σ, where σ is the constant degree of relative risk
aversion.  Hence, for σ large enough (σ >2) this elasticity is positive and we have sunspots. Woodford’s
(1994) example is thus a special case of our much more general result.
10 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) impose restrictions on the steady-state leisure-consumption ratio.  For
the preference specification they use this ratio is proportional to the steady-state labor supply elasticity.